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IN THE SUPREME CO·URT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
C. G. GREEN, 
Plaintiff and App~llant, 
-vs.- I LED 
EDGAR E. GARN and NOV 3 - 1960 
CLEO V. GARN, 
Defendants and Respondents. - ---··ci;~k:--s~j;~;;n~--c~~ri;··u-+;;h·u~ 
* * * * * 
E. E. GARN, 
Plaintiff and Respon.dent, 
-vs.-
JENSEN, et al., 
C. G. GREEN, 
Respondents ,and 
Cross Defendants, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
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RAY S. McCARTY 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF U'TAH 
C. G. GREEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
BDGAR E. GARN and 
CLEO \r. GARN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
* * * * * 
E. E. GARN, 
Plaintiff and Respond·ent, 
-vs.-
J-ENSEN, et al., 
C. G. GREEN, 
Respondents and 
Cross Defendants, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT:S 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9303 
Case No. 
9302 
The statement of facts in appellant's brief is largely 
accurate The appellant has unduly emphasized certain 
facts and insufficiently emphasized or entirely disre-
garded other important facts. Theref'Ore, the respondents 
are constrained to re-state the facts in their entirety. 
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2 
The parties will be referred to either as appellant 
and respondents or by their nan1es. The two cases 'vHl 
be referred to by their number in this Court. Italics 'vill 
be our own. The dep'Osition of Dr. Green will he referred 
to as the Green transcript and the deposition of Garn 
will be referred to as the Garn transcript. 
The appellant, Dr. C. G. Green, is a dentist and for 
years practiced in Salt Lake City. He tired of the practice 
of dentistry and thought he could make a living another 
way. His memory vvras bad as to what occurred back in 
those days, but he thought it was around 1940 when he 
quit dentistry. He bought the lease on the Copper Club, 
and at first he said he didn't remember what he paid 
for it and then he said he thought he paid $15,000.00 
down (Green Tr. 2-4). He was sure he had a contract, 
but he didn't remember what it was and he had no 
papers at all. Whether the price was $15,000.00 or he 
paid $15,000.00 cannot be determined on account of the 
doctor's poor mem'Ory. The 'vritten agreement on 'vhich 
Dr. Green's claims are based showed that he owed addi-
tional money to one William Schmidt. There is nothing 
in the record 'Or in the exhibits to sh0"\\7 the contents of 
the lease on the 'Copper Club. In fact, he didn't remember 
that he ever saw a lease. He obtained an assignment and 
he doesn't know whether he had a copy of a lease or 
not. He didn't recall ever exhibiting a lease to the Garns. 
There were two men, Griggs and Stanfield, who had an 
interest in the lease. What it was does not appear and 
he never did meet them (Green Tr. 4-7). 
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So1netilne in 1947 \\"hile the plaintiff and his \vife, 
Cleo Garn, \vere operating the Lone Pine Lodge in 
l\iarysvale, Utah, they were contacted by Elmo Garff 
and Lynn Garff, dba Garff l~ealty, licensed real estate 
brokers. They represented Dr. C. G. Green for the pur-
pose of inducing the Garns to purchase the interest of 
Dr. Green in the Copper ·Club at Ely, Nevada. Dr. Gre,en 
represented to the Garns that the prior owners had been 
1naking from $70,000.00 to $80,000.00 per year, net, in 
operating the club, and he also represented there was 
$3,500.00 to $4,500.00 \Vorth of liquor stock (R. 57, Case 
No. 9302). 
The \vritten agreement marked Exhibit "A," Case 
No. 9303, was dated December 10, 1947. It appears from 
this agreement that the Garns issued a promissory note 
in the sum of $5,000.00 to Dr. Green and assigned to him 
all of their interest in the Lone Pine Lodge. The agree-
nlent also provided that the Garns were to receive the sum 
of $500.00 a month as a living wage for operating the club, 
deduct operating expenses, and thereafter pay to Dr. 
Green each month all additional profits up to the sum of 
$500.00. Should the profit exceed $500.00 a month, then 
the Garns might p,ay any amount they wished on the 
purchase price. The entire purchase price had to be paid 
prior to the expiration of the term of the lease dated 
June 12, 1946. ~There is nothing in the record to show 
\Yhen the lease expired or its provisions. The contract 
also provided that the payments to Dr. Green should be 
applied first to any balances owing by Dr. Green to 
William Schmidt or by Dr. Green to Schmidt's predeces-
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sors~ There is nothing in the record to show the interest 
of William Schmidt or his predecessors. Then, finally, 
the agreement provides that Dr. Green would be entitled, 
upon ·failure of the Garns to perform after a 15-day 
'vritten demand, to re-enter and take possession of the 
premises of the Copper ·Club without the necessity of 
court action. 
This contract was prepared by the attorney for D-r. 
_Green. The Garns were not represented. Before the Garns 
entered into the agreement, Dr. Green represented he 
had close to $5,000.00 worth of liquor stock, and when 
they went out to examine the place, Dr. Green sho,ved 
the Garns boxes of liquor stacked up \Yith the names 
Hyrum Walker and various other kinds of liquor. \\"'"hen 
they examined the liquor stock, there was not the amount 
represented by Dr. Green, but, on the contrary, less 
than $1,500.00 worth, and it turned out to be a private 
stock less than a month old, flavored \v·ith \\rood chips. 
Later when they opened the place, they had to pay Eva 
Oureta $1,000.00 for licenses. She was the owner of 
the premises. To operate, they had to sell their truck 
for $1,900.00, sell a piano for $450.00, and borro·w· $500.00 
from Garn's brother (Garn Tr. 29 and 30). 
Nevertheless, the Garns endeavored to operate the 
Copper Club and, owing to the fact of the general de-
pression, they were unable to make any money out of 
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the place and finally, after exhausting their resources 
in the sununer of 1948, ~Ir. Garn had a conversation with 
Dr. Green in Salt Lake City and Dr. Green said he felt 
bad that business had gone that 'vay and for Garn to 
do the best he could, and if he could get someone in 
therP and get something out of his interest, fine and 
dandy (Garn Tr. 17). 
Mr. Garn recognized his obligation to help Dr. Green 
get something out of the club. "Well, absolutely! If I 
hadn't done, I believe I would have just walked out. 
At that point I believe I vvould have just walked out 
and slamrned the door and left it like I found it" (Garn 
Tr. 22). 
That day in Dr. Green's office, Mr. Garn told him 
his position and he would have to sell his equity, and 
Dr. Green said, "vV ell, go ahead and see what· you can 
do 'vith it. See who you can find to get in and take it 
over." Garn told Dr. Green he vvas 'vithout funds, 'vith-
out further means of getting any, and Dr. Green said, 
"Okay" ( Garn Tr. 25). 
1.Ir. Garn contacted the Garff Realty to dispose of 
his interest and they declined. Then he walked down to 
see C. Ed Lewis and explained the situation. Then about 
August 16, 1948, he received the following letter from Dr. 
Green: 
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Mr. E. E. Garn 
c/o Copper Club 
Ely, Nevada 
Dear Mr. Garn: 
6 
1001 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
I had a long talk with Mr. McCormick last Saturday 
and gained a considerable amount of information fron1 
him concerning the sale of the Club. Apparently they 
have been misinformed as to the actual set-up between 
you and I, and as a result, have been having a tough 
time in their efforts to dispose of the Club for you. He 
also informed me that you have hindered instead of help-
ing in the sale, this, perhaps because of your anxiety 
to have done with the \vhole thing. But there is a way 
that you can help a great deal, as I \Yill outline to you. 
I told him that you \Vould be willing to take $5,000.00 
and step out in favor of a new buyer, so he suggested 
this procedure: 'Take a new listing for 90 days under 
my signature at a pTice of $17,500.00 complete. ::\ O\V rest 
assured that you will he protected to the extent of 
$5,000.00. Anything over that amount comes to me, and if 
a contract has to be written for any balance, a new one 
will be written between the ne\v buyer and n1yself, thus 
cancelling the contract between you and I. I hope this 
is clear to you so there can be no misunderstanding when 
a deal is finally negotiated. 
Now, for a \Vord on how you can help,. If at any 
time a prospect is sent out there, or if one should just 
happen in, you can assun1e the roll of op,erator of the 
Club and can do a good job of boosting it. Tell them 
the business you are doing, and you might go so far as 
to say you would like to buy it yourself if you could raise 
the money. There is no need for them to know of the 
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~Pt-up hPt\veen us, as that seems to scare then1, making 
the deal too co1nplicated; and that phase need not hinder 
at all according to the understanding we now have. But 
all negotiations must be referred to 1\Ir. McCormick. 
1£ we can carry through on a set-up of this kind, 1\fr. 
McCormick thinks he can move the Club and promises to 
go to ''rork on it, but only under these conditions. 
Let n1e hear fron1 you by return mail so that I can 
let him know that you agree to this p-rocedure. I think 
"\\~e will all benefit as everything will be on the up and 
up and there will be no doubts in the mind of any one. 
Let's get behind and push. 
Respectfully, 
C. G. GREEN, DDS 
ThPn ·on September 18, 1948, Thfr. Garn signed Ex-
hil>it ''G" "\vith the C. Ed Levvis Company and Burrows, 
Jensen, and Payne, wherein he sold all of his interest 
in the club to Burrows, Jensen and Payne. The Garns 
received $3,100 in cash for their interest and a $900.00 
note. After deducting commission and 6::::~enses, 1\fr. 
Garn received $2,300 cash (R. 58, 59, Case :N v. 9302). 
The same day, September 18, 1948, Exhibit "F," an 
Earnest l\Ioney Receipt to purchase the Copper Club, 
"\Vas signed by Burrows, Jensen and Payne. This was 
not signed by Dr. Green nor Mr. Garn. Jensen, Burrows 
and Payne took over the club sometime in September -
according to the pleadings, around September 18, 1948. 
Thereafter, "\vith full knowledge of Dr. Green and with 
his consent, Payne, Burrows and Jensen took over and 
started operating the business (R. 59, Case No. 9302). 
~Ir. Garn stayed three days after the new operators, 
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Payne, Jensen and Burrows, took over to help show 
them where the light switches were, the gas, and all that 
should be done ( Garn Tr. 22). 
Then Mr. Garn went to Santa Clara to op·erate a 
restaurant with his brother. It was there that he next 
saw Dr. Green sometime in February or ·March of 1949, 
when Dr. Green stopped in their restaurant at Santa 
Clara and told the Garns that the people out in Ely 
were doing pretty good and he thought they would make 
out okay (Garn Tr. 26). 
Sometime in February, 1949, a car in which the 
Garns had an equity was attached. They thought the 
suit was for a $5,000.00 note they had given Dr. Green. 
Mr. Garn contacted the Garffs and they said they would 
take care of the $5,000.00 as soon as they sold the Lone 
Pine Lodge, and Garn thought nothing 1nore about this 
case, No. 9303 (R. 59, Case No. 9302). 
The Garns heard nothing more about this case. 'They 
knew nothing more about the claim of- Dr. Green against 
them until October 2, 1959, \Vhen the Sheriff of lTtah 
County levied on their equity in their home and cars 
(R. 60, Case No. 9302). 
The $900.00 note was not paid and 1Ir. Garn turned 
it over to a St. George la,vyer for collection, who sent 
it to Salt L·ake lawyers who started the action on Decem-
ber 29, 19'48, in Case No. 9302 (R. 1). The Garns were 
never in the office of Gustin and Richards and never 
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talked to then1 personally. Jensen, Burro,vs and Payne 
answered and counterclaiined and brought in C. Ed Lewis 
Company and McCorn1ick as a cross-complainant (R. 5-
15, ·Case No. 9302). 
On the 9th day ·of February, 19-±9, ·C. G. Green 
brought suit against E. E. Garn and Cleo Garn, Case 
No. 9'303. On the first cause of action, he asked for 
$4,000.00 on the note and $500.00 attorney's fees. In his 
second eause of action, he asked for $10,000.00 judgment 
against them on account of the contract 'vith the Garns, 
alleging that the Garns had breached the agreement 
by selling and assigning the Copper Club without his 
consent to Jensen, Payne and Burro,vs. On his third 
cause of action, he asked for an additional $5,000.00, or 
a total of $19,500.00 (R. 1-6, Case No. 9303). 
A default certificate was entered in this case (No. 
9303) on the 24th day of 1farch, A.D. 1949~ This was 
later set aside and the defendants allowed to ans,ver (R. 
21, Case No. 9303; answer and counterclaim, R. 21 and 
25, Case No. 9302). In Case No. 9302 in his complaint 
in intervention, Dr. Green asked for judgment against 
the Garns in the sum of $10,000.00 and also an alterna-
tive for $3,100.00 received by him on account of the sale 
of the ·Copper ·Club. Dr. Green filed an amended com-
plaint in intervention on March 18, 1950, in Case No. 
9303, almost a year after he had entered his default 
against the Garns for $19,500.00 (R. 36-40, Case No. 
9302. The complaints in intervention also sought relief 
against E. E. Garn, Jensen, Payne and Burrows, and C. 
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Ed Lewis Company and !1cCormick. 
In paragraph 7 of his con1plaint in intervention (R. 
38, Case No. 9302), Dr. Green alleged the place \vas "\vorth 
in excess of $10,000.00, and Jensen, Payne and Burro"\vs 
were willing to pay that to him. In paragraph 10 (R. 
38A, Case No. 9302), Dr. Green admitted that he dis-
cussed \vith cross-defendant McCormick his interest in 
the Copper Club and his \villingness to sell his interest. 
Then Dr. Green filed his second amended complaint in 
intervention on the 26th of April, 1950. In paragraphs 
10 and 11 of the second amended complaint (R. 46, Case 
No. 9302), Dr. Green alleged as foll·ows: 
"10. Defendants entered upon possession of 
the Copper Club at Ely, Nevada, on or about 
September 18, 1948, and continued in peaceable 
possession thereof until on or about March 15, 
1949, on which date defendants abandoned the 
said premises. 
"11. The aforesaid possession of the defend-
ants ''ras acquiesced in by the intervenor, and de-
fendants' offer to pay the intervenor $10,000.00 
was accepted by the intervenor's said acquiescence 
and consent." 
Defendants referred to were Jensen, Burro"\YS and Payne. 
Then on April 4, 1956, Dr. Green as intervenor filed 
a default certificate against E. E. Garn (R. 51, Case X o. 
9302), and on the same day he took a default judg1nent 
against E. E. Garn for $10,000.00. Nothing \vas done 
then in the case until October 7, 1959, "\vhen he obtained 
a garnishment and writ of attachment and garnisheed 
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the wages of ~1r. Garn and attached the automobiles 
and home of Mr. and Mrs. Garn. The plaintiff moved 
to set aside the judgment and default and be allo,ved 
to ans,ver (R. 54-63, Case No. 9302). The court on De-
ceinber 6, 1959, granted the motion and the order "~as 
signed (R. 65-66, Case No. 9302). 
[n the case of Dr. Green against Mr. and Mrs. Garn, 
Case No. 9303, the plaintiff filed a default certificate on 
the 24th day of March, 1949. This was prior to the time 
he filed his complaint in intervention in Case No. 9302. 
The Garns 1noved to dismiss this case (R. 14-15, Case 
No. 9303). The Court granted the motion to dismiss the 
first cause of action, which was for $4,500.00 on account 
of the original note given by the Garns to Dr. Green. 
Thereupon, on the 14th day of December, 1959, appellant's 
attorney served two copies of the complaint in this case on 
the defendant, and thereafter the Garns file·d their an-
s\ver and counterclaim (R. 21-25, Case 9303). The default 
of the Garns had been set aside. They were allowed to 
answer. 
On the 25th day of April, 1960, Dr. Green moved 
for sumn1ary judgment against the Garns for $5,000.00 
on the third cause of action, and agreed if the motion 
' \Vas granted to dismiss the second cause of action and 
also dismiss Case No. 9302 with prejudice. The Garns 
then moved for summary judgment against Dr. Green 
in both cases. The motion for summary judgment by 
Dr. Green \vas denied and the motions of the Garns in 
both cases were granted. 
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PRELIMINAR.Y ST'ATE.MENT 
The appellant's brief on Point II, "Was there an 
abandonment of the premises by the appellant~" the 
respondents feel this is not a question involved in the 
case; it should have been, "Was there an abandonment 
of the contract, or was there an abandonment by the 
appellant of any -claim against the Garns ~" 
In view of that, the respondents 'vill discuss this 
case under the following points: 
1. T·HERE WAS A RESCISSION OF THE DECEMBER 
10, 1947 ICQN'TRACT. 
(a) There was a surrender of the premises, and 
(b) There was an abandonment of any claim against 
the respondents by the appellant. 
2. THE APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING 
RELIEF FROM THE GARNS. 
ARGUMENT 
POIN'T I 
THERE WAS A RESCISSION OF 'THE DECEMBER 10, 
1947 CONTRACT. 
Generally speaking, a la~'ful rescission of a contract 
by mutual agreement puts an end to it for all purposes. 
Accordingly, it is held that in the absence of circum-
stances pointing to a different intention, neither party 
can 1naintain an action on the rescinded contract for pre--
vious breach thereof. Note 24 A.L.R. 253. 
Utah has subscribed to this doctrine. In the case of 
!Jf,egeath v. Ashworth, Supreme Co~nrt of Utah (Mar. 2, 
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1921), :)7 Utah 564, 196' Pac. 338, the defendant testified 
that some months after sale of car and the execution of 
the note, he advised plaintiff that the car was of no serv-
ice to him and asked him to give back the note and declare 
the deal off, to which he testified the plaintiff replied: 
"All right, take the car and put it in my barn." 
Accordingly, the defendant returned the car to the 
premises of the plaintiff and, finding the garage closed, 
left the car in the yard near the garage. That was some-
thing like five years prior to the institution of the action 
and the car had remained in the possession of the plain-
tiffs ever since. Court held a rescission and judgment 
for defendant and it was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
Talbot v. Anderson, Supreme Court of Utah (Oct. 
28, 1932), 80 Utah 436, 15 P:2d. 3.50: 
"An action cannot be maintained for the 
breach of a contract which has been rescinded or 
canceled, even though such rescission or cancella-
tion is by mutual consent, either express or im-
plied, of the parties." 
See also Schwab Safe & Lock Co. v. Snow, 47 Utah 199, 
152 Pac. 171; and Black on Rescission, Vol. 2, page 1072. 
Restatement of Contracts, Section 406(a): 
''Agreement to rescind need not be expressed 
in words. Mutual assent to abandon a contract, 
like mutual assent to form one, may be manifested 
in other ways than by words. Therefore, if either 
party even wrongfully expresses a wish or in-
tention to abandon performance of the contract 
and the other party fails to object, there may be 
sometimes circumstances justifying the inference 
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that he assents. If so there is rescission by mutual 
t , assen .... 
Considering the facts most favorably to the appel-
lant, Dr. Green, there is no escape from the conclusion 
that there was a mutual rescission. When they entered 
into the contract the Garns made a payment of $5,000.00, 
represented by the assignment of their interest and sale 
of their property in the Lone Pine Lodge at Marysvale. 
The contract did not provide for any special monthly 
amount to be paid by the Garns, but only that they \Vere 
to give Dr. Green 50% after they paid the expenses and 
took $500.00 per month as a living wage. 
Various false and fraudulent representations \Yere 
made by Dr. Green as to the earnings of the club and as 
to the condition of the club to be operated. ·The Garns 
went out to operate the place and \Yhen they did find 
out about the false and fraudulent representations, they 
\Vere in such a financial condition that they had no 
choice but to try and operate the club. The Garns never 
did 1nake the $500.00 living "Tage, let alone anything in 
excess, so at no time ,~(ere they behind in any payments. 
After selling practically everything they owned and 
borrowing everything they could, they found in the 
Sun1mer of 1948 they could no longer operate. Garn 
\vent to see Dr. Green and Dr. Green told him to do the 
best he could, and get somebody else in these and get 
so1nething out of his interest (Garn Tr. 17). 
Dr. Green talked to ~Ir. !IeCorn1ick, a real estate 
salesman for C. Ed Le\vis Con1pany and a cross-defend-
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ant in Case No. 9202. Dr. Green told him to go ahead 
and sell the place and also told him what Green's in-
terest "'"as in it (Green Tr. 12). The letter of Dr. Green 
to E. E. Garn in August 1948 corroborates this. The 
letter indicates that he had a long talk with McCormick. 
This letter proves that ~1cCormick and C. Ed Le,vis 
·Company were his agents. Dr. Green goes so far in his 
letter that he advised the Garns to use fraud and deceit 
if necessary to get someone to take over the business. 
In the letter Dr. Green says that everything will have 
to be referred to Mr. McCorrnick. 1fcCormick obtained 
Jensen, Burro,vs and Payne to purchase the interest of 
the Garns. McCormick then sold the doctor's interests to 
them. This agreement, Exhibit "G," was signed by 
Jensen, Payne and Burrows, but not by the doctor. Jen-
sen, Payne and Burrows took over the operation of the 
club about September 18, 1948, and in his pleadings the 
doctor said that this was done by his (the doctor's) 
acqui·escence and consent. Dr. Green at no time warned 
the Garns that he was holding them to the lease or the 
contract. His actions and his words and his written 
letter demonstrated that he vvas releasing Garns en toto 
and accepting Jensen, Payne and Burrows. This rescis-
sion, cancellation and abandonment not only was oral 
but in writing of Dr. Green and there is also the acts 
of the parties. 
17 CJS, page 880, Sec. 388: 
"The cancellation, abandonment, or rescission 
of a written contract may not only be written but 
it may also be oral or by implied agreement, vvhich 
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may be shown by the acts of the parties and the 
surrounding -circumstances." 
There was a surrender. The Garns never had the 
lease; they only had a right to the lease when Dr. Green 
or his agents, the Garffs, turned it over to hin1. The 
doctor didn't even know what the provisions in the 
lease were, and the Garns had never seen the lease, but 
it is conceded that the doctor had some right of pos-
session there. For awhile he allowed the Garns to occupy 
the premises_, then when the premises were turned over 
by Dri Green's agent, ~icCormick, to Jensen, Payne and 
Burrows, there 'vas a surrender of the pre1nises as far 
as the Garns were concerned. It was by the actions of 
Dr. Green that the Garns were supplanted by Jensen, 
Payne and Burrows. This was recognized by Dr. Green 
and in his pleadings he said that they were there by 
his consent and acquiescence and, the ref ore, Jensen, 
Payne and Burrows should pay him. Dr. Green allowed, 
consented, and contracted so that Jensen, Payne and 
Burrows took over the contract and the possession of 
the place. Under the very terms of the original con-
tract, the Garns would have to retain the possession 
in order to p-ay as provided in the contract. There "Tas 
a surrender. See Belanger v. Rice, Su,preme Court of 
Utah (J~tly 2, 19/54), 2 Utah 2d 250, .:21'2 P:2d. 173; John 
C. Cu}ler v. DeJay Stores, 3 [Jtah 2d 107, 279 P2d. 700; 
Dunles Inc. v. F~delity Co,mpany, 165 S.W. 612. 
J. K. Arntsby Co. v. Grays Rarbor Com1nerciaJ Co. 
rt al., Supre1ne Cou,rt of Oregon (1912),. 123 Pac. 32: 
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~'The ter1n 'rescission,' in relation to con-
tracts, can only apply to the unmaking of the 
contract, the revoking of it by mutual agreement 
of the parties; or it may be effected by an at-
tempt to revoke the contract by one party, acceded 
to by the other, or a breach by one which pre-
cludes him from any remedy thereon, and for 
which the other party revokes it. Miller v. Shel-
burn, 15 N.D. 182, 107 N.W. 51; Bannister v. 
Read, Giln1an (Ill.) 9'2. 
"In the case before usJ the cancellation was 
not mutually accomplished, as each party acted 
independently; but each recognized the contract 
as at an end. When a contract is mutually res-
cinded, the parties are placed in their original 
position, as if it had not been made." 
On page 35: 
"In Graves v. White, 87 N.Y. 463, 465, it is 
said: 'The doctrine of these authorities is that 
the refusal of one party to perform his contract 
amounts on his part to an abandonment of it. 
The other party thereupon has a choice of reme-
dies: He 1nay stand upon his contract, refusing 
assent to his adversary's attempt to rescind it, 
and sue for a breach, or, in a proper case, for 
a specific performance; or he may assent to its 
abandonment, and so effect a dissolution of the 
contract by the mutual and concurring assent of 
both parties. In that event, he is simply restored 
to his original position, and can neither sue for a 
breach nor compel a specific performance, be-
cause the contract itself has been dissolved.' " 
Call it what you will, there was a mutual rescission 
of the contract, a waiver by Dr. Green of any claim 
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against the Garns, and there was a cancellation and 
abandonment of the contract and surrender of the prem-
ises. Jensen, Payne and Burrows were accepted as new 
tenants by Dr. Green. They were also substituted as 
purchasers of the Copper Club. 
POINT II 
DR. GREEN, THE APPELLANT, IS ES'TOPPED FROM 
CLAIMING RELIEF AGAINST THE GARNS. 
By Dr. Green's letter and by his conversation, the 
Garns were given to understand that if someone else 
took over the Copper Club they could leave and take 
what little money they could get for their interest in 
the club and be on their way 'vithout any further claim 
from the doctor. Even in February 1949 at Santa Clara, 
the doctor told the Garns that Jensen, Payne and Bur-
rows were doing fine and would make out all right. All 
the circumstances surrounding the transaction are to the 
effect that Dr. Green had released the Garns. The Garns 
could not turn the place over to Jensen, Payne and 
Burrows and still comply with the contract of December 
10, 1947. Dr. Green knew the Garns 'Yere do,vn and out 
and broke. He was \\rilling that they should get out of 
the picture. His letters and his conveTsations contradict 
his deposition as to McCormick not representing him, 
and the pleadings that he filed in Case No. 9303 "'"ithout 
question show that he acquiesced and consented to the 
Garns being supplanted by Jensen, Payne and Burro,vs. 
The doctor waived all rights against the Garns, and his 
conduct 'v-as such that he is estopped to deny that he con-
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sen ted to or intended a waiver or rescission. Kelly v. 
llicl1ards et al., Supreme Court of Ut~ah (Nov. 4, 1938), 
9:1 Utah 560, 129 A.L.R. 164, 83 P2d. 731; 31 C.J.S. 260, 
Sec. 69. 
CONCLUSION 
Dr. Green was never able to make a success out of 
the operation of the 'Copper Club, but he attempted to 
1nake a success of this venture by litigation. 
It has been difficult to follow through the maze of 
cases commenced by Dr. Green surrounding this Club. 
1. Green v. the Garffs in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, Case No. 84478 (Nov. 1947), in-
volved $5,000.00 note of the Garns. 
2. C. G. Green v. Garns, Case No. 9303 (Feb. ·9, 
1949), for same relief asked against the Garffs, 
plus $15,000.00 additional. 
3. Case No. 9302, Dr. Green as intervenor v. Fran-
ces B. Jensen et al., Dr. Green v. C. Ed Lewis Co. 
and W. A. McCormick, and Dr. Green as inter-
venor against the Garns (Jan. 1950). 
In this case, he asked for $13,100.00 against the Garns, 
notwithstanding he had already entered a default in Case 
No. 9303 on March 24, 1949. In April 1956, a default 
judgment was taken against the Garns in Case No. 9302 
for $10,000.00. 
Thus, we see that Dr. Green attempted to recover 
from practically everyone connected with him in any way 
in the Cop·per Club. The Garffs were his agents, as were 
C. Ed Lewis ~c·ompany and W. A. McCormick, and, of 
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course, Jensen, Payne and Burrows were the people he 
permitted to take over the operation of the club and to 
supplant the Garns. 
Motions to dismiss these two cases for failure to 
prosecute were denied. The respondents maintain that 
this issue is still before this Court, or any other issue 
that would justify a summary judgment in favor of the 
respondents. 
There was mutual rescission which was amply proved 
by the admissions of Dr. Green, the letter of Dr. Green, 
his pleadings, and the actions of the parties. 
By the same token, there was an abandonment of 
the contract with the Garns by Dr. Green, and as far 
as the possession of the premises was concerned, there 
was a surrender by Dr. Green's accepting Jensen et al. 
as the operators and occupants of the club; and Dr. 
Green is estopped to deny no\Y that he consented to or 
intended a waiver or rescission of the contract. 
The summary judgments of the lower Court should 
be upheld. It would he highly inequitable to hold other-
Wise. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYS. I\IcCARTY 
Attorney for Respondents 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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